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Abstract 
Recent exonerations of convicted defendants by the efforts of advocates like the Innocence 
Project are accompanied by a concerning finding that a large proportion of defendants had 
falsely confessed to the alleged crime. False convictions result in due process violations and 
suffering and stigma by the convicted and their families, in addition to imposing an economic 
burden on the community. Prior research has identified structural interrogation practices and 
individual characteristics that increase risk of false confessions, however knowledge on how to 
identify true and false confessions is minimal and undeveloped. Cues to deception in false 
statements may be an effective means of identifying true and false confessions. However, extant 
research on deception detection has not been fully applied to confessions and paralinguistic cues 
(e.g. pauses, pitch change) have never been tested. This study examined the efficacy of training 
in paralingustic cues on the ability to identify true and false confessions. A second goal was to 
assess the use of an online experimental survey as an alternative to traditional experiments. True 
and false confessions to guilt-inducing or shame-evoking events were obtained through an 
adaptation of Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick’s (2005) method. Participants (n = 63) from a second 
sample were randomly assigned to receive training in paralingustic cues to deception or a 
placebo training. Subsequently, participants rated perceived veracity of six confessions and their 
confidence level in each judgment. Consistent with prior research, the results indicated that 
accuracy rates were around chance levels and that confidence was unrelated to accuracy. The 
accuracy rate of the paralingustic group did not significantly differ from the control group, 
possibly due to random effects in treatment assignment. The paralingustic group indicated 
significantly higher confidence than the control group, which highlights a troubling trend that 
deception detection training increases confidence, but not accuracy in judgment. It is essential 
for agents in the legal system - law enforcement, legal decision-makers, and forensic 
psychologists - to be aware of empirically-supported cues to guilt or innocence in confessions in 
order to prevent false convictions and preserve the legitimacy of the legal system. 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
In 1989, five black and Hispanic young men from the ages of 15 to 16 were arrested and 
interrogated for the brutal rape of a white, upper-middle class female in Central Park. After many 
hours of interrogation, they all confessed to the murder and all were eventually convicted. 
Thirteen years later, the real attacker admitted to committing the crime and was matched on 
DNA to the crime scene. A similar case of false conviction involved 11-year old Lacresha 
Murray, who was accused of killing a toddler under her supervision in 1996. In interrogation, she 
stated over 40 times that she did not hurt the toddler, before breaking down and admitting to an 
accidental killing (Drizin & Colgan, 2004). A transcript of the interrogation suggests coercion 
during the interrogation and coaching on the part of the detectives (Krzewinski, 2002). Lacresha 
was given a 25-year prison sentence before an appeals court threw out her conviction in 1999. 
These two famous cases, along with many others, have spurred researchers from the fields of 
criminal justice, legal psychology, social psychology, and communication to ask why individuals 
confess to crimes they did not commit and how the criminal justice system fails to accurately 
identify false confessions.  
The Role of Confessions 
False convictions are increasingly recognized as an issue of concern for the legal system. 
The Innocence Project, begun by Northwestern University, has played a prominent role in the 
recognition of false convictions through their advocacy efforts to exonerate falsely convicted 
offenders, some from death row. Exoneration has typically resulted after DNA testing, which 
often was not an available technique during the time of the alleged offense, but also through 
further investigation that revealed the true perpetrator or an alibi of the convicted individual 
(Drizin & Leo, 2004). The strength of the Central Park Five and the Lacresha Murray cases 
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against the accused lay in the presence of a confession. In 15-20% of DNA exonerations of 
falsely convicted individuals, the evidence against the defendant included the presence of a 
confession or admission to the crime (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Garrett, 2010; Scheck, Neufled, & 
Dwyer, 2000), with even higher rates in capital cases (White, 2003).  
A confession plays an important role in the decisions of judges and jury members. Legal 
researchers have found that confession evidence leads to an increased likelihood of conviction, 
even if the defense is able to present evidence indicating innocence and to demonstrate that the 
confession was obtained through coercive means (Leo & Ofshe, 1998). Leo and Ofshe (1998) 
reviewed 60 case studies of false convictions, finding that evidence indicating innocence was 
overlooked or disregarded by judicial decision-makers when the accused had confessed to the 
crime. Through an experimental study, Kassin & Neumann (1997) tested the weight of 
confession evidence in comparison to eyewitness identification and character testimony. They 
found that confession evidence was more incriminating than other types of evidence and 
produced the highest rates of conviction. Thus, confession evidence is extremely important to 
judicial decision-making. These findings can be corroborated by research indicating that 
confessions, regardless of whether or not they are true, are more readily believed than denials 
and judged as more honest (Levine, Kim, & Blair, 2010). Difficulty in assessing veracity (i.e. 
truthfulness) appears to be a contributed to an inability to detect false confessions, as judges and 
other legal decision-makers tend to focus on inaccurate cues to veracity when judging the 
credibility of a defendant (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).  
Impact of False Convictions 
It is important to identify true and false confessions – at key points of the judicial process 
such as   interrogation, the prosecutorial decision to charge, the trial, or the appeal – in order to 
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protect the innocent against wrongful conviction and to maintain the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system. Wrongful convictions constitute a deviation from the presumed fairness and due 
process of the legal system, which leads to a decreased perception of legitimacy (Williams, 
2000). The 5th and the 14th Amendments to the Constitution guarantee a right to due process in 
criminal justice proceedings, which researchers like Leo (2008) have indicated was lacking in 
many interrogations leading to false confessions. False confessions have only recently been 
brought to the forefront of the legal psychology research due to the recent exonerations of falsely 
convicted individuals, however researchers throughout the 20th century had raised the issue that 
police-induced false confessions are one of the leading causes of miscarriages of justice in 
America (Bedau & Radelet, 1987; Borchard, 1932). 
Beyond violating the due process protection of the innocent, false convictions are 
harmful to the community. First, the criminal justice system spends time and resources in the 
process of trying and convicting suspects. An enormous amount of money is spent in 
incarcerating one individual, estimated to be $30,619 annually in the federal system (Federal 
Registrar, 2015). False convictions have not only ramifications for the individual and the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, but also economic implications for the expenditures of 
the legal system and the taxpayers in the community that fund the system. Additionally, falsely 
convicted individuals have been awarded large amounts of money through civil suits against the 
state after exoneration (e.g. Drizin & Leo, 2004).  
Second, wrongful convictions hold severe consequences for the families of the convicted, 
who are called “secondary victims” of wrongful convictions in a study examining the 
consequences of false convictions conducted by Jenkins (2013). Jenkins’ qualitative study 
involved interviewing 132 individuals affected by false convictions, including 27 falsely 
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convicted individuals or “primary victims”. He found that “secondary victims” - spouses, 
children, and families - often suffer from psychological effects like anxiety, depression, panic 
attacks, or post-traumatic stress symptoms and from financial hardship due to loss of income and 
legal fees (Jenkins, 2013). While some families become estranged or disintegrate due to the legal 
persecution and incarceration of the convicted family member, others persist in believing in the 
innocence of the convicted family member. Further, even families that clung together through 
the appeals process and the eventual release can experience severe consequences after 
exoneration, such as difficulties for children in communicating or for a spouse in salvaging the 
relationship with the “primary victim”.  
False convictions and the subsequent harm to the individuals, families, and the 
community need to be prevented. One approach is to develop better strategies for identifying 
false confessions because such confessions are often the ‘nail in the coffin’ for falsely accused 
individuals, as judicial decision-makers are unable to look past confession evidence. Many actors 
in the legal system have responsibility to identify false confessions and circumstances that may 
elicit false confessions. This includes police officers, detectives, prosecutors, judges, and jury 
members, but also psychological experts who may play a role in the legal process. Psychologists 
are often retained to diagnose a defendant’s mental state (e.g. competence, insanity) or evaluate 
dangerousness or likelihood to recidivate (Tillbrook, Mumley, & Grisso, 2003). In order to 
conduct an accurate evaluation, psychologists may also need to assess psychological effects of 
interrogation (Volbert & Banse, 2014), and to understand who may be at increased risk of giving 
a false confession due to individual characteristics. In sum, it is essential for all agents in the 
legal system, including psychologists, to be aware of false confessions and to have knowledge of 
risk factors and cues to guilt or innocence. 
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Defining False Confessions 
The most influential shift in false confession research was made by Kassin & 
Wrightsman’s (1985) chapter, Confession Evidence, which set the stage for future research by 
arguing for multiple causes of false confessions. Prior to this chapter, research had not examined 
interactions between multiple individual and situational factors that may result in false 
confessions. For instance, Bem (1966) conducted experimental studies on false confessions that 
were attributed to the idea of self-persuasion or internalization of a false event due to the 
approach of the interrogator. The concept of self-persuasion was explained through cognitive 
dissonance - a change in attitude, belief, or behavior resulting from motivation to maintain 
cognitive consistency in the face of conflicting ideas (Festinger, 1957). Contemporaneous events 
such as American soldiers during the Korean War growing to believe the false confessions they 
had given as prisoners of war partially influenced researchers’ focus on cognitive dissonance 
(Brehm & Cohen, 1962).  
In Confession Evidence, Kassin and Wrightsman delineated three types of false 
confessions made in the context of criminal investigations: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and 
coerced-internalized. Voluntary confessions are confessions that occur outside of an 
interrogational context without specific elicitation. Voluntary false confessions usually indicate 
underlying psychological disturbances, as has been seen in high profile crimes like the Lindbergh 
kidnapping in the 1930s or the JonBenet Ramsey murder in the 1990s where multiple individuals 
came forward with false confessions to the crimes (Leo, 2008). Coerced-compliant false 
confessions are made when a suspect falsely admits his or her guilt to law enforcement because 
of extreme methods, stress, pressure, or coercion in the interrogation context, but in actuality, 
they continue believe in their own innocence. Coerced-internalized confessions characterize 
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those confessions made by suspects that come to believe that they actually committed the 
offense. As indicated by Kassin and Wrightsman (1985), the likelihood of coerced-compliant and 
coerced-internalized confessions in interrogation can be increased due to certain factors in both 
the interrogational context and within the individual.   
Police Practices in Interrogation 
The reasons for why innocent people give false confessions has been approached 
primarily from the perspective of legal psychology and applied social psychology. 
Comprehensive assessments of false confessions have focused on psychological processes of 
structural practices in interrogation, and individual factors. The most influential guide to 
interrogation, Criminal Interrogations and Confessions by Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne 
(2001), provides a multi-step approach to getting a suspect to confess, which uses three 
processes: (1) isolation in order to increase anxiety and a desire to escape, (2) confrontation that 
includes accusations and citing real or false evidence against the suspect, and (3) minimization in 
which the investigator justifies the crime and implies leniency in consequences once the suspect 
confesses. These three situational processes are described by Kassin (2008) in terms of how they 
may pressure an innocent and susceptible suspect to confess. The presentation of false evidence 
against the suspect is particularly potent in inducing people to internalize blame and provide a 
false confession, as was demonstrated through an experimental study by Kassin & Kiechel 
(1996). Importantly, Criminal Interrogations and Confessions also provides lie detection training 
in verbal, nonverbal, and behavioral cues to deception. However, the goal of the training is to 
detect when a suspect may be lying by providing exculpatory statements (i.e. statements that 
clear a suspect from alleged guilt), not when a suspect may be lying by providing false 
confessions.   
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Regarding the interrogational process, Kassin, Leo, Meissner, Richman, Colwell, Leach, 
and La Fon (2007) conducted an extensive review of police practices in interrogation and their 
beliefs about interrogational practices - the first study to use a self-report survey to assess police 
interrogation techniques. The researchers surveyed 631 investigators across 16 police 
departments in the United States and Canada with the goal describing the law enforcement’s 
perspective on police interrogations and false confessions. The findings indicated that 
investigators with more years of experience, special interrogational training, and greater 
confidence in their own deception detection skills were more likely to presume guilt, endorse 
more interrogational techniques, and to more frequently use psychological manipulation and 
confrontation in interrogation. In terms of extant interrogational techniques, four factors of 
interrogation were isolated through factor analyses: (1) isolation, rapport, and minimization, (2) 
confrontation, (3) threatening the suspect, and (4) presentation of evidence. Under the first 
factor, interrogational practices included sympathy, self-interest, developing a rapport, and 
minimizing the offenses, as well as isolating the suspect. Confrontation practices include 
contradicting what the suspect says, confronting the suspect, and interrupting denials. 
Threatening practices circulated around threatening the suspect with punishment, demonstrating 
frustration and anger, and physically intimidating the suspect. Finally, presentation of evidence 
against the suspect may include failed polygraph exam results, eyewitness testimony or crime 
scene photographs – which may be true or fabricated by the interrogator.  
Kassin et al. (2007) also examined the investigators’ perceptions of the prevalence of 
false confessions. Investigators indicated an average interrogation length of 1.6 hours with their 
longest interrogation lasting an average of 4.2 hours. This finding is disproportionately shorter 
than the average 16.4 hours of interrogation time in known false confession cases reviewed by 
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Drizin and Leo (2004). Drizin and Leo (2004) found that known false confessions occurred in 
extraordinarily lengthy interrogations - quite longer than normative police interrogation time. In 
the Kassin et al. (2007) study, interrogators provided their own estimate of the self-incrimination 
rate for innocent suspects, which was an average of 4.78% or nearly five out of every 100 
confessions. Investigators themselves recognize the existence of false confessions, however it is 
unclear how investigators’ decision or confidence that a confession is true or false is related to an 
actual ability to detect false confessions. 
In the case of the Central Park 5, multiple coercive interrogation practices were 
apparently implemented by interrogations (Drizin & Leo, 2005). Two of the youth had been 
interrogated throughout the night and the following day after their arrest. Although the 
confessions were recorded on video, the earlier interrogation sessions leading up to the 
confessions were not recorded. Throughout the trial, the youth and their families describes highly 
coercive interrogations with physical slapping, yelling, and cursing. Several of the youth were 
promised to be released from custody if they confessed to the crime, while one, Antron McCray, 
was told that he would be treated as a witness, not as a suspect, if he admitted to participating in 
the rape. One of the interrogating officers – Detective Thomas McKenna – later described how 
he falsely told one of the youth – Yusef Salaam – of how his fingerprints were found on the 
jogging shorts of the victim (Sullivan, 1990).  
In addition to structural interrogation practices, stress due to police pressure certainly has 
an additional influence on risk of false confessions (Ofshe & Leo, 1997; Gudjonsson, 2003). 
However, researchers have suggested that the single strongest technique that induces false 
confessions is the promises of leniency if the suspect confesses and promises of more punitive 
outcome if the suspect does not (Leo, 2008). This forces a suspect to balance the immediate 
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benefits of falsely confessing against the eventual risk and cost of prosecution. Those suspects 
who believe that their innocence will eventually be brought to light despite a false confession in 
the immediate future are more likely to give a false confession in interrogation (Gudjonsson, 
2003; Kassin, 2005).  
Individual Risk Factors 
It is important to note that not everyone may be equally at risk for giving a false 
confession because individual characteristics may contribute to falsely confessing above and 
beyond a coercive interrogational context. Youth and intellectual disability tend to be risk-factors 
for false confessions. Intellectual disability (previously called mental disability or mental 
retardation) and lower Intelligence Quotient scores increase likelihood of falsely confessing in 
interrogation (Leo, 2008; Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010) because of 
impairments in cognitive processing and increased compliancy (Drizin & Leo, 2004).  Drizin and 
Leo (2006) indicated an overrepresentation of youth as known false confessors, because 
juveniles tend to be more impulsive and less able to perceive future risk and long-term 
consequences (Owen-Kostelnik, Reppuci, & Meyer, 2006). The presence of a serious mental 
illness and drug intoxication also increase risk of falsely confessing for a suspect (Redlich, 
Kulish, & Steadman, 2011; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1996). 
Personality traits of compliancy and suggestibility may result in individuals changing 
their memory based on what they are told under pressure (Gudjonsson, 2003) and developing a 
belief that they actually committed the act that they are accused of committing – resulting in the 
coerced-internalized confession type indicated by Kassin & Wrightsman (1985). Experimental 
studies designed to test the ability of individuals to internalize suggested events have 
implemented false memories such as being attacked by an animal (Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 
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1999), or cheating on a recent test (Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). Shaw and 
Porter (2015) found that in their false memory experiment that 70% of their participants 
internalized (i.e. grew to believe) a false memory over multiple interrogational sessions about 
committing a criminal event in their past (i.e. assault, assault with weapon, or theft) which had 
been corroborated by evidence fabricated by the researcher. 
These experimental studies raise concerns about the ease of internalization of false 
confessions in the context of a confident interrogator, repeated interrogations, and corroboration 
by external sources that serves as evidence. Biases of interrogators, coercive structural 
interrogation practices, and individual risk factors may elicit false confessions during 
interrogation. These findings have indicated the need for more objective, empirically-based 
interrogation techniques that can also provide a safeguard against false confessions.  
Using Psychological Research to Inform Interrogational Practices   
In contrast to prevalent interrogational practices that may increase risk of false 
confessions, researchers has advocated for the use of psychological research to inform sound 
interrogational practices. Two broad approaches to conducting interrogations have been 
suggested in order to accurately identify deceptive exculpatory statements, while minimizing 
coercive practices that may elicit false confessions. The approaches entail the strategic-use of 
evidence (SUE) technique and the theory of cognitive load (Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip, & 
Yoo, 2014). These approaches differ from extant interrogational practices conducted by law 
enforcement by relying on cognitive psychological research and by providing a context for 
truthful statements to be identified by the nature of their statement.  
The SUE technique involves the strategic disclosure of incriminating evidence in order to 
test for statement inconsistencies and has been validated through several experiments (Hartwig, 
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Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006). However, the incriminating evidence should be real, 
rather than false.  Meissner & Kassin (2004) advise against the method of presenting false 
evidence, which can take the form of an alleged failed polygraph, fingerprint, hair sample, or 
eyewitness because presenting false evidence can influences both guilty and innocent 
confessions. It is not unreasonable to suppose that some of the individual risk factors – juvenile 
status, intellectual impairment, or intoxication – may increase the risk of innocent suspect of 
perceiving incontrovertible evidence against them and eliciting feelings of hopelessness.  
The concept of cognitive load is based on the premise that additional cognitive work is 
necessary to facilitate a lie in comparison to telling the truth because lying is more demanding of 
cognitive processes (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). Telling a deceptive story is more cognitively 
taxing because the deceiver needs to formulate the lie and mask the truth, in addition to 
monitoring their own demeanor and behavior to appear honest to the interviewer (DePaulo & 
Kirkendol, 1989) and monitoring the interviewer’s reactions and behavior to access their own 
success at deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). It is important to note that practical safeguards, 
such as video-recoding of interrogations, are additionally necessary to minimize coercive police 
interrogations (Kassin, Appleby, & Perillo, 2010). 
Although the theory of cognitive load has only received wide attention recently (Vrij, 
Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006), researchers have begun to test multiple techniques designed to 
increase cognitive load. Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, Wei, & Zha (2005) suggest asking 
a suspect close-ended questions under time pressure. (Evans, Michael, Meissner, & Brandon, 
2013) tried to increase cognitive load by asking participants to describe events in their second 
language, rather than their primary language. Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne, & Bull (2008) 
conducted two studies that increased cognitive load for “suspects” by asking them to recount 
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their stories in reverse order (i.e. starting from the end of the story and tracing the steps 
backwards to the beginning). The reverse-order stories that were false contained more cues to 
deception in comparison to a control group that told their stories in chronological order from 
beginning to end. Furthermore, police officer participants that assessed veracity where 18% more 
likely to detect deception when considering reverse-order false stories in comparison to 
chronological false stories (60% accuracy in comparison to 42% accuracy).  
The principle of cognitive load may provide an effective psychological framework for 
developing deception detection techniques. The cognitive load for a suspect who is telling a 
truthful statement will be different from the cognitive load for a suspect who is telling a 
deceptive statement due to increased cognitive processing needed to tell a false story (Vrij et al., 
2008; Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). As will be indicated later, cognitive load also is the 
psychological basis for empirically-supported deception detection cues that can be used to 
distinguish between true and deceptive statements.  
Deception Detection in Practice 
Deception detection is necessary for investigators and judicial decision-makers to 
evaluate the guilt or innocence of a suspect. Unfortunately, considerable research across a variety 
of individuals – law enforcement officers, judges, jury-members, college students - suggests that 
participants are generally poor at detecting deception, doing so around chance levels, both in 
social contexts and criminal interrogations (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, Bull, 1997; Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 1982; Ekman & 
O’Sullivan, 1991; Memon, Vrij, & Bull, 2003; ten Brinke & Porter, 2013; Vrij, 2000). Vrij 
(2000) concluded that accuracy rates of professional investigators range from 45% to 60%, 
averaging around 54% accuracy. A meta-analysis of 108 studies on deception detection by 
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Aamodt & Custer (2006) concluded that individual differences, including age, gender, education, 
law enforcement experience, and confidence were all unrelated to the ability to detect deception. 
These unimpressive findings regarding deception detection by professionals and laypersons 
emphasize the importance of finding an objective means of identifying deception and 
implementing effective training in deception detection. Unfortunately, researchers have also 
found that deception detection accuracy does not appear to increase with experience or training 
(DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Leach, Talwar, Lee, Bala, Lindsay, 2004; Kassin & Fong, 1999; 
Köhnken, 1987).  
Despite the fact that many professional investigators claim that their experience in 
interrogation enhanced their skill in detecting deception, Kassin, Norwick, & Meissner (2005) 
found that investigators with prior interrogation experience had poorer accuracy than students 
with no prior interrogation experience in identifying true and false confessions of criminal 
offenders. Further, there was no relationship between years of experience and accuracy. 
Investigators had higher confidence in their deception detection abilities – a finding which is 
supported by other researchers who have found that investigators believe in a “sixth sense” for 
detecting deception (Leo, 1996), despite no actual correlation being found between level of 
confidence and accuracy. Further, investigators were more likely to judge make judgements of 
guilt regardless of veracity by judging both true and false confessions to be “true” as an 
admission of guilt, demonstrating a “guilt bias”. Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell (2009) 
also found a guilt bias on the part of military intelligence investigators because the investigators 
demonstrated impairment in judging accuracy when investigators suspected that the individual 
under interrogation was guilty. Their study further indicated that, overall, accuracy rates were 
higher with identifying true rather than false statements. Despite the “guilt bias” of investigators 
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in interrogation, the participants who are not investigators tend to be more accurate at identifying 
true statements in comparison to deceptive or false statements (Levine, Park, & McCornack, 
1999; Vrij & Baxter, 1999). This finding is explained as natural because the majority of 
statements heard from others – both face-to-face and online - tend to be truthful (Hancock, 
2007).   
 The presumption of guilt on the part of trained investigators sets into motion processes 
during interrogation that may ultimately serve to confirm interrogators’ expectations. Kassin, 
Goldstein, & Savitsky (2003) conducted an experimental study with undergraduate students 
posing as “interrogators” or “suspects” during a mock interrogation. Half of the “interrogators” 
were led to believe that a suspect was guilt and the other half were led to believe a suspect was 
innocent. In the experiment, half of the “suspects” were actually guilty of carrying out a mock 
theft and half were innocent. The results of this 2 (guilty expectation vs. innocent expectation) x 
2 (actual guilt vs. actual innocent) experiment, found that interrogators with guilty expectations 
were 23% more likely to judge guilt. Expectations of guilt led to more guilt-presumptive 
questions and a greater variety of interrogational techniques. Moreover, actual guilt or innocence 
interacted paradoxically with expectations as interrogators demonstrated more aggression with 
innocent suspects, which in turn constrained the behavior of the suspects and led the 
interrogators to perceive guilt.  
The confirmation bias in interrogation indicates that plausible denials may be discounted 
or misinterpreted as investigators will selectively seek and interpret new information in a way 
that verifies their belief of guilt (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Kassin et al. (2003) further 
suggest that this conformation bias may exacerbate the problem that police interrogators are 
overconfident in their ability to detect true and false statements. The lack of accuracy in 
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deception detection – demonstrated across investigators and laypersons – raises the question of 
what methods exist for identifying true and false statements. Do these methods actually increase 
accuracy of deception detection and, if so, are they applicable specifically to confession 
statements? 
Distinguishing Between True and False Statements  
Identification of true and false confessions has received limited attention from the 
deception detection field. Experts may hesitate to label a false confession as deceptive due to the 
lack of outright intent or motivation to profit by deception. Moreover, the deception in an 
exculpatory statement may differ from deception in a false confession, as suggested by research 
indicating that advance preparation of a lie may result in a “larger quantity of words”, while 
lying on the spot without advance preparation may result in less words begin said in comparison 
to a truthful statement (Burgoon & Qin, 2006).  
Although false confessions and deliberate deceptions may differ in intent, both types of 
false statements share the quality of being falsified as the story provided by the individual is not 
based on an actual experience and originates internally. Johnson & Raye (1981) distinguished 
between externally-originating events that are based on actual experience and internally-
originating events that are based on a fabrication and suggested that the two types of events are 
qualitatively different. Their research was based on the Undeutsch hypothesis, which suggests 
that qualitative and quantitative differences exist between true and deceptive statements 
(Undeutsch, 1982). Rather than considering that the motivation of the “deception” in true and 
false confessions excludes them from the category of “deception”, the present study sought to 
connect deception detection research with confessions based on fundamental differences between 
truthful and false statements. The Undeutsch hypothesis and Johnson & Raye’s (1981)’s 
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categorization of externally-originating and internally-originating events, serve as the 
foundation for considering deception detection research in the context of true and false 
confession.  
Deception detection research has approached cues to deception in three general 
directions: nonverbal cues (e.g. eye contact, posture), paralinguistic (also known as vocal or 
auditory) cues (e.g. pauses, pitch change), and verbal cues (e.g. amount of detail, negative 
words). Overall, research has failed to support the majority of nonverbal cues to deception 
detection (Vrij, 2008a). Prior to the 1980s, research focusing on nonverbal deception detection 
primarily considered behaviors like facial expressions, posture shifting, gaze aversion, 
movements of the hands and feet (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1969; 1974, Ekman, Friesen, & 
O’Sullivan, 1988). Complex and objective methodologies using automatic, computerized 
technology to assess nonverbal body language like movement and position of the face and hands 
have even been proposed (Meservy et al., 2005). Despite the expectation of empirical support for 
a widely accepted nonverbal indicator of deception - micro-expressions (i.e. short-span facial 
expressions that constitute “emotional leakage” of a lie that cannot be suppressed) - Porter & ten 
Brinke (2010) found no published empirical research on micro-expressions. Even the polygraph, 
which is the most widely used technological device for lie detection, raises concerns among 
researchers due to a high false positive rate (Vrij, 2008a). The polygraph is an instrument that 
measures physiological arousal by recording heart rate, blood pressure, breathing rate, and skin 
conductance (i.e. how easily the skin conducts a small current of electricity due to perspiration) 
(Bartol & Bartol, 2015). While the polygraph is used by various government agencies, its lack of 
acceptance by the general scientific community has led to its being inadmissibility in court as 
evidence by the prosecution (Myers, Latter, & Abdollahi-Arena, 2006).  
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The gold-standard for interrogation – the Reid technique - claims an 85% accuracy level 
in detecting deception or truth by using a combination of nonverbal cues like gaze aversion or 
frozen posture, behavioral attitudes like anxiousness or guardedness, and verbal cues like 
rehearsed-sounding responses (Kassin et al., 2007). The Reid technique has been established as 
training for hundreds of thousands of investigators across the world (John E. Reid & Associates, 
2004). However, experimental studies have found that training in the Reid technique fails to 
improve judgement accuracy in distinguishing true and false denials both among college students 
(Kassin & Fong, 1999) and among experienced investigators (Meissner & Kassin, 2002), 
although the confidence of trained investigators in their judgments increases.  
Deception detection training provided to professionals often boasts empirical support, 
which may contribute to investigators’ increased confidence – the strength of their belief that a 
judgment of truth or deception is accurate. Vrij (2008b) points out that police officers in 
interrogation focus heavily on nonverbal behaviors, specifically visual cues like gaze, movement, 
or posture, which is recommended in the Reid method (Inbau et al., 2001), while neglecting to 
examine the speech of a suspect (i.e. verbal and paralingustic cues). However, when 
investigators focus on speech-related or verbal cues, their deception detection accurate rates tend 
to increase in comparison to those simply observing visual behavior (Vrij, 2008a). Further, 
focusing on speech in interrogation would have a secondary effect of encouraging the suspect to 
talk, providing additional possible cues to deception, and giving the investigator a wider breadth 
of speech to examine (Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007).  
Many investigators claim that training or years of experiences provide them with an 
intuitive ability to detect deception (Kassin et al., 2005). Intuitive or subjective deception 
detection abilities have not been supported by research.  Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle & 
APPLYING DECEPTION DETECTION TO TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS 
 
21 
 
Green (1999) found that laypeople rely on common-knowledge or cues to deception that are not 
empirically-supported when making an intuitive judgement of veracity. A study by Garrido, 
Masip, & Herrero (2004) found that police officer participants demonstrated a chance probability 
of detecting deception, while students achieved a higher rate of accuracy, which the researchers 
attributed to a focus on inaccurate cues to deception. Moreover, intuitive judgement fails to 
demonstrate test-retest reliability, meaning that the same results are not yielded across different 
investigators or different points in time, which has been demonstrated in both experimentally-
manipulated and naturalistic contexts (Leach, 2006). This further indicates the fallibility of 
interrogators’ confidence in their deception detection accuracy.  
Despite the discouraging findings of many studies, the deception detection field has 
indicated that taking into account or focusing on certain verbal or paralingustic cues can improve 
deception detection (Vrij, 2008a). For instance, Vrij, Edward, & Bull (2001) found that direct 
assessment (i.e. asking if an individual is lying) does not result in accurate identification of 
deception by police officers, but using empirically-supported cues such as speech hesitations or 
latency period (i.e. number of words per minute of speech) did result in greater accuracy. These 
positive findings regarding verbal and paralingustic cues to deception suggest that analyzing the 
speech of a confession statement for empirically-supported indicators of veracity may provide a 
way of distinguishing between true and false confessions.  
Applying Deception Detection to Confessions 
Several studies have directly examined the applicability of empirically-supported 
deception detection cues from research to true and false confessions. These studies used content 
analyses to examine suspect statements (Garrett, 2010; Willén & Strömwall, 2012; Appleby, 
Hasel, & Kassin, 2013) rather than testing the efficacy of deception detection cues in identifying 
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true and false confessions. First, Appleby et al. (2013) conducted a content analysis of false 
confessions that indicated that false confessions are more than mere admissions of guilt; rather, 
they contain a rich and textured account of the crime along with an explanation of the motive. 
Additionally false confessions contain accurate crime details, which tend to be more convincing 
to juries. However, this inclusion of accurate crime details is suggested to be due to the 
confrontation of the suspect with evidence such as pictures of the victim or crime scene during 
interrogation. This process, Appleby et al. (2013) argue, gives the suspect information to draw 
from when providing the false confession. These findings are supported by a previous content 
analysis by Garrett (2010), which also found accurate crime details in false confessions that, 
according to investigators, “only the perpetrator could have known”. Appleby et al. (2013) 
address deception detection cues by qualifying the crime scene details as visual and auditory 
details. This categorization is consistent with prior research that suggests verbal cues can 
indicate, contrary to this content analysis, higher levels of truthfulness (Vrij, 2008a). However, 
as can be seen from the Appleby et al. (2013) and Garret (2010) studies, extensive visual and 
auditory details - a form of verbal cues to deception – were found in false confessions. This 
conflicts with the research on true and false statements in general that indicates lower amounts of 
various types of details (e.g. contextual, spatial) in false statements (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & 
Herrero, 2005). 
Willén & Strömwall (2012) tested the ability of verbal cues to deception to distinguish 
between true and false confessions of criminal defendants. The researchers sought to find out if 
two specific measures – Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) or Reality Monitoring (RM) - are 
able to distinguish between true and false confessions either. The Undeutsch hypothesis of 
qualitative and quantitative differences between true and false statements formed the basis for 
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clinically-developed SVA measure and the empirically-based RM measure (Köhnken, 2004; 
Johnson, 1988). These two measures were originally intended for determining veracity of 
victims’ stories, but they have been adapted by researchers for use with suspects (Porter & 
Yuille, 1995; Sporer, 1997; 2004). Willén & Strömwall (2012) found that neither measure 
wholly distinguished between true and false confessions, however certain individual criteria did. 
As the authors point out, this does not dismiss the validity of those measures, but merely 
indicates their inapplicability to criminal confessions as obtained in this particular study. Despite 
this, three of the individual criteria did distinguish between true and false confessions. Consistent 
with Appleby et al. (2013), remorse or apologies (i.e. self-deprecation) were found at higher 
rates in false confessions. Willén & Strömwall (2012) found that higher rates of doubts about 
testimony are present in false confessions in comparison to true confessions, however, a meta-
analysis by Vrij (2008a) failed to confirm that finding. The only other significant criterion was 
unexpected complications (i.e. tangential or irrelevant information) – more likely to be found in 
true statements. Again, this criterion received only limited support in Vrij’s (2008a) meta-
analysis. Studies examining verbal cues have found varied reliability of established cues, such as 
those from the reality monitoring approach (Masip et al., 2005, Porter & Yuille, 1996).  
In summary, the verbal and the paralingustic cues have gathered more support than 
nonverbal or body language cues in the deception detection literature, however verbal cues may 
be differentially related to true and false confessions than to true and false statements in general. 
In practice, deception detection researchers who aim to increase empirically-based police 
interrogational practices advise against the use of non-verbal or body language cues in favor of a 
focus on the speech of a suspect – the verbal and paralingustic cues that may be present (Vrij, 
2008; Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). Porter & ten Brinke (2010) provide a review of 
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relevant literature on nonverbal, verbal, and paralinguistic cues to deception. In their review, 
they point out the efficacy of both the verbal and paralinguistic approaches, while concluding 
that certain paralingustic cues fall among the most supported cues to deception – pauses, 
repetition, response latency, speech rate. Specific verbal and paralingustic cues associated with 
deception and truth-telling are summarized below. This study considered both verbal and 
paralingustic cues to deception for application to true and false confessions. The cues considered 
in this study were identified based on empirical-support and reliability in the research literature 
(See Table 1). Ultimately, the verbal cues were dropped from consideration due to estimations of 
low sample size and concerns about a differential relationship to confessions statements (e.g. 
Appleby et al., 2013); however, they are presented here for descriptive purposes for 
consideration by future research. 
Verbal Cues 
Research on verbal or linguistic differences in deception detection indicates that 
deceptive individuals tend to use fewer first-person pronouns or self-references (e.g. “I”, “my”, 
“me”), more negative emotion words (e.g. “hate”, “worthless”, “enemy”) or negative 
statements, and fewer “exclusive” words that demonstrate a cognitive complexity to a story (e.g. 
“except”, “without”, “but”) (Newman et al., 2003). The use of lower self-references is also 
supported through experimental research by Feeley & deTurk (1998). Deceptive statements are 
less likely to be direct, relevant, logically-organized, and clear (DePaulo, Malone, Lindsay, 
Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003) (i.e. immediacy cues). Fuller, Biros, Burgoon, 
Nunamaker (2013) found the following constructs associated with deception: lower quantity (e.g. 
word quantity), lower lexical diversity (e.g. content word diversity, redundancy) and higher 
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uncertainty (e.g. generalizing terms), both of which are supported by additional research (Janux 
2014).  
Paralingustic Cues 
In comparison to the verbal cues, which require a content analysis of speech, 
paralingustic cues require attention to the quality of production of the speech itself. Burgoon and 
Qin (2006), DePaulo et al. (2003), Davis, Markus, Walters, Vorus, & Conners (2005), Sporer & 
Schwandt (2006), Porter & ten Brinke (2010) indicate that consecutively repeating a phrase or 
word in speech can be indicative of deception (i.e. repetition). Speech errors fall under the 
paralinguistic category as research indicating that non-fluent or difficult to understand speech 
that may include grammatical errors, sentence incompletion, or slips of the tongue may indicate 
deception (Kraut, 1980; Feeley & deTurck, 1998; Vrij, 2008a; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & 
Rosenthal, 1981). Pitch has also been examined as a cue, with research indicating that higher 
pitch is associated with deception (Vrij, 2008a). Characteristics of pauses have also been 
examined with higher frequency of pauses, longer pause duration (i.e. pause within speaker’s 
own speech), response latency (i.e. pause between when an interlocutor stops and the speaker 
begins to speak), and presence of speech hesitations (e.g. um, uh) within pauses (Vrij, 2008a, 
Janux, 2014). A variety of studies indicate that the number of words can be an important cue to 
deception with lower speech time (i.e. time spent talking) associated/predicting with deception 
(Feeley & deTurck, 1998, Vrij, 2008a). Studies by Feeley & deTurck (1998) & Vrij, Edward, & 
Bull (2001) also supported the findings that speech hesitations or latency period (i.e. number of 
words per minute of speech) can be indicative of deception.  
Certain paralinguistic cues like increased latency (i.e. time lapse between question and 
answer), speech hesitations (use of “ums” “uhs” or “ers”), speech errors, and a slower rate of 
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speech are associated with increased cognitive load (Goldman-Eisler, 1968, Smith & Clark, 
1993, & Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). Cognitive load, previously mentioned as a focus of 
interrogational practices relying on empirically-supported psychological research, lends support 
to the investigation of paralingustic cues to deception in the search for indicators of veracity in 
confessions, as was done in the present study. However, it is important to note that there does not 
appear to be broad consensus in the research literature on certain cues. For example, Fuller, 
Biros, & Wilson (2008) found that cues of generalizing terms, lexical diversity, and speech time 
are significant in regression models as predictors of veracity, while cues such as pauses and 
repetition are not significant. Differences are also observed based on amount of preparation for 
the lie; for instance, unprepared lies demonstrated a longer response latency period in 
comparison to prepared lies (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). These studies highlight the need for 
research to further examine the categorization of deception detection cues. 
Table 1  
Cues to Deception Detection Considered for Inclusion 
Verbal Paralinguistic Placebo/Control 
Negative Statements - Higher use of 
denials, negative emotion words, or 
disparaging statements can indicate 
deception.  
 
Pitch - Deceptive individuals are more 
likely to have a higher pitch in their 
speech. 
 
Personality Disorders (e.g. narcissistic, 
borderline, antisocial, or histrionic) - Individuals 
with these disorders tend to be more confident 
and skilled in lying. 
 
Generalizing Terms - Higher use of 
generalizing terms like "always", "never", 
"nobody" can indicate deception. 
 
Pauses - Longer pause durations in speech 
can indicate deception. 
 
Extroversion vs. Introversion - Extroverts 
typically lie more than introverts; however, 
introverts display more cues to deception. 
 
Self-references - Lower use of self-
references (e.g.  “I”, “me”, or “mine”) and 
higher use of group-references (e.g. “we”) 
can indicate deception. 
 
Talking - Individuals tend to spend less 
time talking or give overall shorter 
statements when being deceptive. 
 
Self-Monitoring - High self-monitoring (i.e. 
controlling behavior in front of others) may 
enable deception skills, but strong self-
consciousness tends to make a less believable 
impression. 
Immediacy cues - Failing to be direct, 
relevant, logically-organized, and clear can 
indicate deception. 
 
Repetition - Consecutively repeating a 
phrase or word in speech can indicate 
deception. 
 
Cross-Cultural Deception Detection - Cultures 
may define deception differently and it is more 
difficult to detection deception across cultures 
than within a culture. 
 
Lexical diversity - Failing to use a variety 
of words in speech can indicate deception. 
 
Speech Errors - Speech that is non-fluent 
or not understandable, grammatical errors, 
sentence incompletion, slips of the tongue 
may indicate deception. 
 
Language Differences - Deception detection is 
more difficult when speaking with someone in a 
foreign language, partly because it may 
automatically elevate uncertainty and tension.  
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The Present Study 
This study bridges empirically-supported deception detection cues with the practice of 
identifying of true and false confessions. With the goal of identifying an applicable deception 
detection approach or valid cues to evaluate confession evidence, this study tests the efficacy of 
training in deception detection in the context of audio-recorded true and false confessions. 
Previous research applying deception detection cues to true and false confessions have only 
focused on verbal cues. This study seeks to test the efficacy of paralinguistic cues, which have 
not previously been examined in the context of confessions.  
The study used an online experimental survey to evaluate the efficacy of paralingustic 
cues in judging veracity of true and false confessions. The survey presented a training video and 
subsequently presented six audio-recorded confessions – half of which were true and half false – 
for participants to rate as true or false. In the interest of comparing verbal and paralinguistic cues, 
the survey was initially designed with two training videos and one control video. Due to 
expectations of a low response rate, concerns about applicability of verbal cues to confession 
statements, and potential difficulties in participant interpretation of verbal cues, only the 
paralinguistic training condition and the control condition were retained. The control training 
video presented general deception detection information (e.g. cultural considerations in 
deception detection) that were unlikely to be relevant to the stimuli (i.e. true and false 
confessions) (See Table 1 for control condition cues). Verbal cues were dropped from 
participants partially because prior studies raised concerns about reliability and difficulties in 
assessment (i.e. content analysis) (e.g.  Porter & Yuille, 1996, Appleby et al., 2013, Willén & 
Strömwall, 2012). Further, Porter & ten Brinke (2010)’s review of deception detection cues 
indicated that certain paralingustic cues are highly supported by the research, including pauses 
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and repetition, while verbal cues are more likely to require “knowledge of its proper manner of 
interpretation”. Lastly, while prior research has examined the applicability of verbal cues to 
deception, the examination of relevant paralingustic cues to true and false confessions is a novel 
contribution by this study.  
This study design is unique in using an online survey with embedded video and audio to 
conduct an experiment on deception detection. While previous experimental studies (e.g. Kassin 
et al., 2005, Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001) relied on in-person meetings to administer training and 
collect data, this study conducts both through an online survey, which demands less time and 
resource investment by researchers. A secondary goal of this study was to evaluate the online 
experimental survey design which is able to (1) randomly assign participants into experimental 
and control conditions, (2) administer training and stimuli embedded in the survey, (3) recruit 
greater numbers of participants that may be difficult to access or recruit in person. 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1 (RQ1). This study evaluates if conducting online experimental 
studies on deception detection is an effective alternative to traditional, in-person experiments. 
Response rates, attribution, missing data, and time to completion data will be examined in a 
qualitative assessment of the methodology. 
RQ2. Prior studies have found that individuals are generally poor at detecting deception 
or ascertaining veracity of confessions, with accuracy rates around 50% or at chance levels (Vrij, 
2008a). Further this finding holds true across different professions, training, and years of 
experience (Aamodt & Custer, 2006). Are accuracy rates in identifying true and false 
confessions are also around chance levels? It is expected that overall accuracy rates for both 
conditions combined will not deviate significantly from chance (50%).  
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RQ3. Past research finds that training in deception detection increases confidence in 
deception detection abilities, however it appears that confidence is not actually associated with 
accuracy. This raises concerns investigators who receive deception detection training will be 
overconfident in their abilities (e.g. Kassin et al., 2005). The association between accuracy and 
confidence of participants in this study will be examined. It is expected that there will also be no 
significant correlation between confidence and accuracy. Furthermore, participants are expected 
to overestimate their abilities by providing ratings of confidence above the midpoint of the 
confidence rating scale. 
RQ4. Empirically-supported paralingustic cues may increase accuracy in judging veracity 
of confessions. Despite the discouraging findings of many prevalent lie detection trainings or 
techniques, relevant training in empirically-based cues can increase accuracy rates (Vrij, 2008a). 
As paralingustic cues have not previously been tested with confessions, this study examines if 
participant receiving training in paralingustic cues will have higher accuracy in detecting true 
and false confessions in comparison to participants receiving a placebo training. It is 
hypothesized that training in paralinguistic cues will lead to a higher rate of accuracy in 
comparison to the control group. 
RQ5. The general public demonstrates an overall increased accuracy with identifying true 
statements in comparison to false statements (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 2009; 
Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999; Vrij & Baxter, 1999). This question, however, has not been 
examined with regard to confessions. Will participants demonstrate a higher rate of accuracy in 
identifying true confessions relative to false confessions? It is expected that accuracy rates of 
identifying true confessions will be higher than accuracy rates of identifying false confessions 
across both groups of participants. 
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RQ6. If confidence increases as a result of training, will the control group with the 
placebo training also demonstrate increased confidence in judgments of veracity? Differences in 
confidence ratings across groups may not be demonstrated, given that the participants in the 
placebo condition are unaware of the irrelevance of their training to the stimuli. Alternatively, 
participants in control group are unlikely to find their cues to deception relevant to the stimuli, 
thus, they may not be less confident in their judgments.  
RQ7. To test the efficacy of the trainings, the utility of specific paralingustic or placebo 
training cues to participants’ decision-making will be examined. To this end, the frequency of 
cues from the trainings indicated by participants to be relevant to their judgment of a confession 
as true or false will assessed.  
Methods  
This study evaluated the effects of empirically-based video education (i.e. training) in 
deception detection on identification of true and false confessions and consisted of two phases. 
Phase 1 consisted of participant interviews to obtain audio-recorded true and false confessions to 
events that elicit emotions of guilt or embarrassment. To obtain true and false confessions, the 
methodology from Kassin, Meissner, and Norwich’s (2005) study was adapted for use in this 
study. The audio-recorded confessions obtained in Phase I were used as stimuli in Phase II. 
Phase II used an experimental survey to administer training in deception detection to participants 
and to subsequently present stimuli (i.e. audio-recorded confessions) to test their ability to 
identify true and false confessions. Phase II employed a 2x2 experimental design to test the 
efficacy of deception detection training in paralinguistic cues. The first independent variable (IV) 
manipulated was veracity (i.e. truthfulness) with two levels: truth and falseness. The second IV 
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was the deception detection training type (i.e. paralingustic vs. control). The primary dependent 
variables measured were the judgment of veracity (i.e. true vs. false) and level of confidence. 
Phase I Participants 
The participants were 11 graduate students at a major university in the Pacific Northwest 
who were recruited through flyer invitation from eight different departments. Phase 1 
participants were required to be graduate students due to the intent to distribute the survey in 
Phase 2 solely to undergraduate students. In order to avoid any overlap of participants, graduate 
student status was a requirement for participation in Phase I and undergraduate student status 
was a requirement for participation in Phase II.  
Phase I Procedure 
Participants were asked to provide a true confession (Part A) and a false confession (Part 
B) by the researcher during a private interview. The confession was recorded in the form of a 
story told by the participant and the single prompting question by the researcher was excluded 
from the audio-recording. To maintain confidentiality, participants were asked to avoid using full 
names, specific locations, or other information that could lead to their identification. Further, 
participants were told that absolute confidentiality cannot be guaranteed because the audio-
recordings that may be played for participants in future studies. They were asked to consider any 
possible negative consequences if the content of their true confession was linked to their identity. 
These consequences, which were delineated in a checklist on the consent form, included harm to 
reputation (1), psychological harm such as anxiety or depression (2), risk of loss of employment 
or employability (3), risk of damage to personal or professional relationships (4), criminal or 
civil liability or consequences (5). Audio-recorded confessions were only collected from 
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participants who confirmed that none of the consequences in the checklist could result from a 
loss of confidentiality through identification by signing a consent to release the audio-recordings.  
In Part A (i.e. true confession), participants were asked to identify a recent event or act in 
their past that elicited emotions of guilt or embarrassment and to provide a two to three minute 
confession to that event or act, providing as much detail as they deemed necessary. Once the 
researcher completed the instructions, the participant was given up to 5 minutes prepare to tell 
their true confession. Afterwards the researcher began the audio-recording and the participant 
provided their true confession. The true and false confessions were collected using a “yoked” 
procedure adapted from Kassin, Meissner, and Norwick’s (2005) study. The first participant 
provided a true confession, then that true confession was condensed by the researcher into a short 
paragraph that detailed the "who, what, where, when, and why" of the confession. This short 
paragraph was provided in typed form to the second participant to be used as a prompt to devise 
a false confession. This procedure was repeated for all participants.  
In Part B (i.e. false confession), each participant was instructed to imagine as if they 
experienced the story provided to them and to devise a two to three minute confession to that 
event or act, providing as much detail as they deemed necessary. Participants were given up to 5 
minutes to prepare their false confession. After this time, the researcher began the audio 
recording and the participant provided their false confession. In compensation for their 
participation, each participant was awarded a $15.00 gift certificate to a local store. The “yoked” 
procedure was repeated until a total of 18 confessions were obtained from participants, 9 true and 
9 false. For the survey in Phase II, three true and three false confessions were randomly selected 
to be included in the survey. Efforts were taken to avoid selection of two confessions of the same 
event (i.e. a true and false confession to the same event or act by two different participants), two 
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confessions by the same individual (i.e. a true and false confession provided by the same 
participant), and confessions whose audio-recording was compromised (e.g. background noise). 
Phase II Participants 
Participants were 63 undergraduate students at a major university in the Pacific 
Northwest. 60 participants provided full demographical information. Considering the 
undergraduate sample, age was relatively well-represented: 44.8% (n = 26) of participants were 
18-21, 25.9% (n = 15) were 22-25, 6.9% (n = 4) were 26-29, 15.5% (n = 9) were 30-39, and 
6.9% (n = 4) were 40-59. 69.0% (n = 40) of participants identified as female, 29.3% (n = 17) 
identified as male, and 1.7% (n = 1) participants identified as ‘other’. 67.2% (n = 39) of the 
sample identified as White or European American, 8.6% (n = 5) identified as Asian, 6.9% (n = 4) 
identified as Black or African American, 2.7% (n = 1) identified as Native American/Native 
Alaskan, 10.3% (n = 6) identified their race as ‘other’, and 5.1% (n = 3) identified with more 
than one race category. Within the sample, 5.2% (n = 3) of participants identified their ethnicity 
as Hispanic, 72.4% (n = 42) identified as White/Non-Hispanic, and 22.4% (n = 13) identified 
their ethnicity as ‘other’. This sample was considered to be representative of the demographics 
the institution’s population.  
Phase II Experimental Procedure 
The experimental survey was administered online through Qualtrics software to participants, 
who were randomly assigned to the experimental group or the control group by the software. The 
deception detection trainings were delivered by video and embedded in the survey from public-
domain YouTube videos. All video trainings used in the experiment were obtained through Dr. 
Norah Dunbar’s course on deception detection from the University of Oklahoma (Janux, 2014). 
In each video, Dr. Dunbar, a researcher in communication and deception detection, presented 
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training on deception detection and covered the following studies: DePaulo et al., (2003), Feeley 
and De Turck (1998), Mann, Vrij, Leal, Warmelink, and Forrester (2012), and Vrij (2008a).   
The experimental group received a training video on paralingustic cues to deception, while 
the control group received a placebo video that provided general deception detection information 
such as personality influences and cross-cultural differences. None of the cues covered in the 
placebo training video were referenced in any confession obtained in Phase I. The placebo 
training primed a participant for deception detection without providing any cues to deception that 
were relevant to the confessions. DePaulo, Lassiter, and Stone (1982) indicate that priming for 
deception detection has an effect on deception detection accuracy even when only instructing 
participants to focus on certain cues. Using a placebo training condition instead of a “no 
training” condition provided a closer match between the two groups in order to allow for the 
effect of paralinguistic training to be detected, rather than an effect of any training that primes a 
participant to detect deception.  
From the paralingustic and placebo videos, five of the most salient deception cues 
covered in the video were summarized below the video for the participants. The deception 
detection cues and their summaries are shown in Table 1 by training type. Participants were 
asked to think about these cues when completing the audio-recordings. Due to different 
quantities of applicable cues from each video, certain cues were added from the research 
literature to the text below the video in order to compose five cues for each group. However, the 
broad goal of this study was to test the applicability of paralinguistic cues to confessions, rather 
than the efficacy of the specific cues presented.  
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Phase II Measures  
After the videos, the six audio-recorded confessions were provided as stimuli for 
participants to judge as ‘true’ or ‘false’. Each confession was presented on a separate webpage 
with a set of questions regarding judgment of veracity, confidence level, and specific cues 
considered in judgment. Participants were prevented from returning to already submitted 
webpages. No feedback regarding accuracy was given at any point during or after the survey.  
Judgment of veracity was obtained using a dichotomous rating of either ‘true’ or ‘false’. 
The confidence in judgment rating was obtained using a six-point Likert scale ranging from 0 
(not at all confident) to 5 (completely confident) with a midpoint of 2.5. Information on the 
specific cues from the video considered by participants in their judgment of the confession was 
obtained through a multiple selection question for the five cues from the corresponding video 
with an open-answer “other” option. This question allowed the participant to indicate which of 
the cues, if any, they noticed or used to judge a specific confession. The open-answer “other” 
option collected any alternative information that the participants considered in judging veracity.   
Demographic information regarding age, gender, race & ethnicity, and student status was 
collected at the end of the survey. A final question assessed any technical issues that may have 
been experienced by the participant. Technical issues did not appear to be an issue for 
participants with only one participant indicating difficulty with listening to a single recording. 
The final page of the survey consisted of a thank you notification, an explanation of the lottery 
entry process, and contact information for the researchers. The survey software, Qualtrics, 
collected time information for each participant regarding how many seconds/minutes were spent 
on a given page of the survey.  
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Results 
Research Question 1 evaluated the efficacy of conducting an online experimental survey 
on deception detection in comparison to traditional, in-person experiments. Distribution resulted 
in an estimated 19% response rate (i.e. opening survey) and a 7.6% completion rate. Survey time 
information obtained through Qualtrics was used to exclude participants falling below the 
minimum time required to complete each training video and audio-recording.  
Sixty-three valid surveys were analyzed out of 159 total (i.e. complete and incomplete) 
surveys collected. During data collection, 159 individual survey results were collected. Note that 
Qualtrics software submits incomplete surveys after one week of inactivity. A survey time 
variable was calculated to assess minutes spent within the survey by each participant using 
indicators of date/time begun and date/time of last activity. Thirty-five surveys were excluded 
due to no time spent on survey. Five surveys were excluded due to participants indicating their 
student status as not undergraduate. Qualtrics allows the addition of timing questions on each 
survey page that can indicate the time (in seconds) that a participant spends on a given page 
before submitting the page and continuing onto the next. These timing variables allowed the 
assessment of how long a participant spent on the video page and on each confession page in 
order to fully watch the video and fully listen to each audio-recording. The minimum required 
time to complete the activities was estimated to be 20 minutes. Forty-five surveys were excluded 
due to total survey time falling below 20 minutes. Note that these 45 surveys included 
incomplete surveys that contained no data. Eleven surveys were excluded because survey time 
exceeded three hours, which raised concerns about the effectiveness of the training after a 
significant period of time. Note that the majority of the surveys falling over the acceptable time 
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were also incompletes where participants left the survey at some point but did not close out of 
the browser until the following day or days later.  
 Research Question 2 examined the overall accuracy of participants in comparison to 
chance levels of accuracy. The overall accuracy rate of participants was 52.9% (n = 63), which 
did not differ significantly from chance levels, t(62) = 1.12, p = N.S, d = .141. Accuracy rates per 
each of the six confessions ranged from 36.1% to 71.7%, indicating variability in accuracy rates 
across each individual confession (See Table 2).  
Table 2 
Accuracy Rates and Mean Confidence Across Confessions 
 
N Accuracy % 
Mean 
Confidence 
SD 
Confidence 
True Confession #1 60 60.0 3.38 1.34 
True Confession #2 60 71.7 3.50 1.48 
True Confession #3 61 36.1 3.16 1.07 
False Confession #1 62 58.1 3.40 1.37 
False Confession #2 61 47.5 2.95 1.42 
False Confession #3 59 42.4 3.21 1.41 
All True Confessions 62 55.7 3.35 1.01 
All False 
Confessions 
63 50.3 3.19 1.06 
All Confessions 63 52.9 3.27 0.95 
Note: Confidence was scaled from 0 – 5, with a midpoint of 2.5 
 
Research Question 3 examined the association between participants’ accuracy in 
identifying true and false confessions and their confidence level in the judgment. Correlational 
analyses showed that the overall accuracy rate and mean confidence across all confessions were 
not significantly correlated (r = .027, p = N.S). Confidence in true confession judgments was not 
significantly correlated to accuracy in judging true confessions (r = .145, p = N.S) and 
confidence in false confession judgments was not significantly correlated to accuracy in judging 
false confessions (r = (-) .089, p = N.S). Despite the nonsignificant findings, the correlational 
coefficient of confidence in true confessions is positive and slightly higher than the coefficient of 
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confidence in false confessions. The confidence rating scale ranged from 0 (not at all confident) 
to 5 (completely confident) with a midpoint of 2.5. The average rating of confidence for true 
confessions (M = 3.35, SD = 1.01) was slightly higher than the average rating of confidence for 
false confessions (M = 3.19, SD = 1.06), with an overall average rating of confidence of 3.27 (SD 
= 0.95) (See Table 2). Both groups had mean confidence levels above the scale mid-point of 2.5 
(See Figure 2).  
Research Question 4 examined if training in paralingustic cues would increase accuracy 
in identifying true and false confessions in comparison to a placebo training. An independent-
samples t-test was conducted to examine differences in accuracy between the paralingustic 
training group and the control group. The results indicated that the mean accuracy rate of the 
paralingustic group (M = .553, SD = .202) was higher than mean accuracy rate of the control 
group (M = .508, SD = .210), however the difference was not found to be statistically significant 
t(61) = .870, p = N.S, d = .22. Figure 1 displays the means accuracy rates for confessions by 
condition. 
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Figure 1: Accuracy Rates in Identifying Confessions By Group 
 
Research Question 5 compared accuracy rates between true and false confessions for all 
participants combined in order to test for the presence of a truth bias in the sample. A truth bias 
would be indicated by significantly higher accuracy for true confessions in comparison to false 
confessions. The accuracy rate of true confessions was 55.7% (n = 62) and the accuracy rate of 
identifying false confessions was 50.3% (n = 63). A paired-samples t-test was conducted to 
evaluate if accuracy rates differed between true and false confessions. Although the accuracy rate 
of true confessions (M = .557, SD = 258) was higher than the accuracy rate for false confessions 
(M = .503, SD = .300), this difference was not significant t(62) = 1.131, p = N.S., d = .14.  
Research Question 6 examined differences between the paralingustic and control groups 
in terms of confidence in judgment. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to examine 
differences in confidence level. The results indicated that the mean confidence rating of the 
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paralingustic group (M = 3.52, SD = .184) was significantly higher than mean confidence rating 
of the control group (M = 3.05, SD = .149), t(61) = 2.017, p = .048, d = 0.51 (See Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Mean Confidence Level in Judgment of True and False Confessions By group 
  
Finally, Research Question 7 tested the manipulation effect of the experiment by 
examining the frequency of cues from the training videos that were indicated as relevant to 
participants’ judgments. Participants in each condition indicated which cues, if any, from their 
training video were used in judging veracity, with an option to write-in other cues (see Table 3 
for frequency of cues used by group type). The frequency counts indicate that the paralingustic 
group (f =304) indicated a greater number of cues relevant to their judgment in comparison to 
the control group (f =129). 
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Table 3 
Frequency of Cues Used By Participant Group 
 
 
Participants also provided qualitative information using the open-text answer underneath 
the ‘other’ option on the multiple answer question regarding specific cues considered relevant to 
their judgment. No character length limited the answers and some were extensive (e.g. “she had 
heavier breathing and small sighs in the pauses making it seem as though she was telling a lie or 
was struggling to make a story”). Participant were able to indicate cues of their own, rather than 
choosing cues from their training, such as “changes in tone” or “upspeak” from participants in 
the paralingustic trainings. For example, one participant in the placebo training wrote in “lack of 
empathy” for a judgment of deception. Most commonly, however, participants in the 
paralingustic confessions wrote in cues that matched their training such as “ums”, “speech 
hesitation”, “sights, ums”, “use of ums, ahs”, “a lot of hesitation noises”, “speech hesitation”, 
“lots of ‘um’”, “um’s and uh’s”, “semi-frequent ‘uhm’s’ and ‘uh’s’”, “said ‘um’ numerous 
times”, “hesitation ("ums" & "uhs")”,  “some phrases jumbled together”, “too many ‘ums’", 
“[quiet] talk, mumbling”, “voice inflection”, and “pausing”. Conversely, some participants in the 
paralingustic training mentioned verbal cues, such as “inconsistencies in story”, “less plausible 
story”, “this is implausible”, and “lack of specificity”. These responses indicated that participants 
used the open-text options mostly to elaborate on or reaffirm their choices out of the cues 
Paralingustic Group f % Control Group f % 
Longer Pause Durations 75 22.3% High Self-Monitoring 58 45.0%
Speech Errors 69 20.5%
Extroversion vs. 
Introversion
46 35.7%
High Pitch 62 18.5%
Presence of Personality 
Disorder
12 9.3%
Phrase/Word Repetition 58 17.3%
Cross-Cultural 
Differences
7 5.4%
Speech Time 40 11.9% Language Differences 6 4.7%
All Paralingustic Cues 304 100.0% All Control Cues 129 100.0%
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provided through their training, but a few participants mentioned cues outside of their training as 
relevant to their judgment.  
Discussion 
This study tested whether training in paralingustic cues to deception increased accuracy 
in identifying true and false confessions, the association between confidence in judgment and 
accuracy, and the efficacy of a conducting experiments on deception detection online. Consistent 
with prior research on deception detection, the combined accuracy rate of all participants was not 
significantly different from chance levels and confidence was not found to be related to accuracy 
– either positively or negatively (Research Questions 2 and 3). Deception detection accuracy on 
true and false statements tends to be around chance levels regardless of law enforcement 
experience or confidence (Aamodt & Custer, 2006). With respect to true and false confessions 
specifically, confidence has also been indicated to be unrelated to accuracy (Kassin et al., 2005).  
Contrary to expectation, there were no significant difference in the accuracy rates of the 
paralingustic and control groups (Research Question 4). Despite the observed non-zero effect 
size (i.e 0.22) of training on the accuracy of the paralingustic group, the mean difference between 
the groups was not statistically significant. These results do not indicate that all paralingustic 
cues are ineffective in identifying true or false confessions, rather that the training using this 
particular set of paralingustic cues is not suggested to be effective in identifying these true and 
false confessions.  
Prior research had not considered the applicability of paralingustic deception detection 
cues to true and false confession; instead, the few studies testing the applicability of deception 
detection cues to confessions focused on verbal cues. Verbal deception detection cues have also, 
on the whole, not been applicable to true and false confessions to the same extent as to true and 
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false exculpatory statements. This was indicated in Appleby et al.’s (2013) and Garrett’s (2010) 
content analyses of false confessions, which found extensive visual and auditory details in false 
confessions, although paucity of such detail is a cue to deception in false exculpatory statements 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Vrij, 2008a). Moreover, Willén & Strömwall (2012) found that two 
empirically-tested measures of verbal cues to deception (i.e. Statement Validity Analysis, Reality 
Monitoring) did not distinguish between true and false confessions and only a minor subset of 
the individual cues were able to do so. Vrij’s (2008) meta-analysis, failed to provide strong 
support for these individual cues indicated in Willén & Strömwall’s (2012) study to effectively 
distinguish between true and false confessions. This meta-analysis, however, examined studies 
that had tested all types of true and false statements, not just confessions. Overall, research has 
been encouraging in the efficacy of empirically-supported paralingustic and verbal cues to 
deception in identifying true and false statements (Vrij, 2008a; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). The 
findings of the present study and studies examining verbal deception detection cues in 
confessions suggest that deception detection cues indicated as effective in identifying true and 
false statements may have a differential relationship to true and false confessions.  
Interestingly, participants did not show a higher rate of accuracy in identifying true 
confessions in comparison to false confessions (Research Question 5), contrary to expectations. 
Despite a small, non-zero effect size (0.14) of type of statement (true vs. false) on accuracy rates, 
the difference between accuracy of identifying true and false confessions was not statistically 
significant. This lack of truth bias, demonstrated by participants in this study differs from prior 
research on participants’ judgments of true and false statements. Investigators tend to have a 
“guilt bias” – an increased likelihood of judging both true confessions and false confessions as 
true and the suspect as guilty (Kassin et al., 2005; Burgoon et al., 2009). Participants who are not 
APPLYING DECEPTION DETECTION TO TRUE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS 
 
44 
 
trained investigators, however, demonstrate a ‘truth bias’ and, thus, are more likely to judge true 
statements as true than false statements as false (Levine et al., 1999; Vrij & Baxter, 1999). The 
findings of the present study suggest that the “truth bias” may not be demonstrated when 
identifying true and false confessions. As confessions may qualitatively differ from the types of 
statements (e.g. exculpatory statements, social conversation) used in prior deception detection 
research (e.g. Kassin et al., 2003, Anderson et al., 1999), participants may assess confessions 
differently than other types of statements.  
Confidence in judgment of true and false confessions was not found to be significantly 
related to accuracy of identifying true and false confessions, although participants across both 
groups demonstrated levels of confidence above the scale midpoint. Moreover, participants in the 
paralingustic group indicated significantly higher confidence than participants in the control 
group (Research Question 6). The finding that confidence increases but accuracy does not 
increase due to training highlights a concerning trend in deception detection research. With 
specific regard to confessions, trained investigators also demonstrate poor accuracy and 
increased confidence. In the study which provided the methodology for obtaining true and false 
confessions for the present study, Kassin et al. (2005) found that trained investigators were less 
accurate at identifying true and false confessions in comparison to untrained students, but they 
were more confident in their judgments. Trained investigators were not only overconfident in 
their abilities, but they also displayed a “guilt bias” which resulted in an increased perception of 
both true and false confessions as true. Prior research has generally indicated that trained 
investigators, in comparison to untrained participants, indicate higher confidence in deception 
detection abilities while not displaying higher rates of accuracy (Meissner & Kassin, 2004). The 
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implications of this discrepancy between confidence and deception detection ability will be later 
discussed.  
Confidence may have been increased for the paralingustic group because participants in 
the control group did not find their cues to deception relevant to the same extent as participants 
in the paralingustic group, and thus were less confident in their judgments. This is supported by 
the difference in frequency of cues indicated as relevant to judgment between the groups. 
Participants in the paralingustic group indicated a higher frequency of cues from their training as 
relevant to their judgments. This may suggest that the paralingustic training was more useful to 
the decision-making of participants than the control training (Research Question 7). However, it 
is important to note that the control condition was a placebo training and the participants had no 
knowledge that their training would be inapplicable to the confessions. Cues of the placebo 
training such as self-monitoring or extroversion vs. introversion, which were the most frequently 
indicated by participants, could have been construed by participants to be present in the 
confession. None of the placebo cues were explicitly mentioned or alluded to in the confessions, 
however participants were not prevented from attributing qualities to the individual telling 
confession based on the content of the confession.  
Conducting online experimental studies appears to be resource-effective, with less effort 
required in soliciting participants and minimal researcher investment (Research Question 1). The 
response rate of the survey in the present study was low. Low response rates tend to increase the 
likelihood that a sample is not representative of the population examined, which decreases the 
external validity of the findings. The low completion rate suggests there may be a trade-off 
between lower researcher investment and a lower participation rate. Fewer participants may be 
recruited online than in person. However, a researcher may conduct multiple distributions to 
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multiple participant pools, resulting in more solicitation than may otherwise be possible through 
in-person recruitment. Experimental studies may reach more extensive participant pools through 
venues like Mechanical Turk, which provides more diverse participants than typical college 
samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).  Like in-person experiments, an online survey 
can eliminate invalid participation through collected time information and can obtain qualitative 
feedback.  
Implications 
The results of this study regarding poor judgment accuracy and increased confidence due 
to training have serious implications for interrogational practices and assessment of confessions 
provided by suspects. Training in deception detection, especially if it appears scientifically-based 
and objective, appears to increase confidence in deception detection ability, regardless of actual 
increases in deception detection ability. Trained investigators who are confident in their ability to 
detect deception appear to be poorer in their ability to detect true and false exculpatory 
statements (i.e. denials), being more likely to perceive denials provided by suspects as deceptive 
(Meissner & Kassin, 2002). Training in deception detection cues that are not empirically-
supported may be to blame for the poor accuracy of trained investigators. For instance, the Reid 
technique increases the confidence of trained individuals in their judgments of true and false 
exculpatory statements, however it does not increase accuracy in identification of true and false 
statements with both students and trained investigators (Kassin & Fong, 1999; Meissner & 
Kassin, 2002).  
The “guilt bias” and unfounded confidence in deception detection ability is detrimental to 
the identification of innocent suspects because higher confidence is associated with increasing 
use of interrogational practices that may elicit false confessions. The increase in confidence of 
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investigators is also associated with an inclination to presume the guilt of a suspect, and 
investigators may fall prey to the confirmation bias during interrogation, which leads 
investigators to selectively seek and perceive new information in ways that support their belief of 
guilt (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). The confirmation bias was demonstrated in Kassin et al.’s 
(2007) experiment which found that investigators’ special training in interrogation and greater 
confidence in their own deception detection skills lead them to presume guilt and to more 
frequently use psychological manipulation and confrontational techniques when interrogating 
suspects. Investigators who expected a suspect to be guilty perceived plausible denials as 
resistance to the interrogation and evidence of guilt. Investigators who expected a suspect to be 
innocent, in turn, perceived denials as more plausible. When confidence in deception detection 
ability is paired with a poor ability to actually detect deception, interrogators may assume 
assuredly that their interrogation will oust the guilty but they fail to identify when an innocent 
suspect provides a false confession.  
The present study contributed to research on true and false confessions in several ways. 
First, the experimental design of the study demonstrated that empirically-supported deception 
detection training increases confidence in deception detection ability in a sample that was 
previously untrained in deception detection. This differs from prior research that had used 
experienced investigators who were possibly trained in multiple or empirically-unsupported 
deception detection techniques (e.g. Kassin et al., 2005). Second, it questions the applicability of 
paralingustic deception detection cues to confession statements, which had not previously been 
tested. Although paralingustic or auditory cues to deception appear to be more effective in 
identifying true and false statements (Anderson et al., 1999; DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 1982), 
this study found that training in paralingustic cues did not contribute to significantly higher rates 
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of accuracy of identifying true and false confessions. Finally, this study examined a new method 
to conduct experiments on deception detection by designing an experimental survey to distribute 
to participants online. A qualitative evaluation of this method suggests that it has the potential to 
minimize researchers’ invested time and effort, however, additional research is needed to 
determine the feasibility of different research questions or the ability to obtain a desired sample 
size.  
Thus, future researchers are encouraged to test this methodology to determine if online 
experimental surveys can be comparable to traditional, in-person experiments. It is important to 
design experimental studies with trainings to present empirically-supported cues to deception 
and approaches that are consistent with research on interrogation techniques. It is a possibility 
that online experimental studies on deception detection may be more effective for certain 
research questions that may not have as many limitations as the present study had. For instance, 
evaluating the effects of gender or mood on perceived veracity of true and false statements may 
be more feasible for online experimental surveys than testing the efficacy of a training in 
deception detection.  
Additional research is needed on the applicability of paralingustic cues to confession 
statements, which can examine different paralingustic cues, the effects of a different training 
design, or the utility of paralingustic cues in distinguishing between true and false criminal 
confessions. The present study used confessions to non-criminal events or actions. Alternatively, 
future studies may explore additional applications of deception detection cues to confessions, 
such as verbal or nonverbal cues, and combinations of different cues. Identifying other types of 
false statements such as false witness statements is another direction in which future research on 
deception detection may contribute to the prevention of false convictions. The importance of this 
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direction is emphasized by Wilson (2003), who found that wrongful convictions may be caused 
partly by testimony of “smooth and convincing” liars as witnesses. 
Limitations 
This study faced several limitations. In terms of the methodology to elicit true and false 
confessions, there was a lack of corroborative evidence for the true confessions. Participants 
were asked to provide a true confession to an event that elicited feelings or guilt of 
embarrassment, however, no verification was conducted to ensure that their confessions were 
true. False confessions, on the other hand, were known to be false as the material for the 
confession was provided to participants during the procedure. 
The experimental and control groups each had 30 and 32 participants, respectively. The 
low sample size may have contributed to a lower likelihood of differences in accuracy rates 
between the groups from being detected. Regarding differences in accuracy rates between the 
paralingustic and control groups, it is important to note that sample size (N = 63) may have fallen 
short of estimated required sample size to achieve adequate statistical power. Post-hoc power 
analyses using the G*Power computer program (Faul & Erdfelder, 1998) confirmed that the 
study was underpowered with achieved power of 0.14. A total sample of approximately 210 
participants would be needed to obtain statistical power at the recommended .80 level (Cohen, 
1988) assuming a large effect size of .5. A medium effect size (0.5) was detected for the 
difference in mean confidence levels between the groups, however, it is inconclusive if the non-
significant effect size of mean differences in accuracy rates (0.22) between the paralingustic and 
control groups would hold up in future studies. 
Further, the experimental training video on paralingustic cues may have been too brief to 
be effective. As Frank and Feeley (2003) indicate, an effective training in lie detection needs to 
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include the following elements: relevance, high stakes, proper implementation, empirical testing, 
generalizability across contexts, and generalizability over time. The training videos offered no 
exercises to test deception detection with feedback on performance. Receiving feedback on 
performance may have allowed participants to learn from their mistakes, but may have 
confounded the assessment of confidence in judgment for participants. Further, feedback on 
performance is not provided when deception detection is required in the real world where 
practitioners must often rely on only their own judgment.  
Another possible limitation is the external validity of participants’ assessment of 
confessions as stimuli. The participants were not able to interact with the individuals providing 
the confession or ask follow-up questions, which is possible for investigators in interrogation. 
However, research has found that degree of interaction may affect accuracy of identifying true 
and false statements in interrogation. Dunbar, Ramirez, and Burgoon (2003) suggest that the very 
act of interaction in the interrogational context may create an amplifying effect in terms of a 
deception bias in perception of veracity because observers, as opposed to individuals engaged in 
the conversation, tend to have higher rates of accuracy in detecting false statements but may be 
impaired in identifying true statements. Other research (e.g. Buller et al., 1991, Feeley & 
deTurck, 1997) has indicated that observers are better at judging accuracy of a conversation than 
those participating in a conversation. However, most of these studies were conducted with 
student participants, who are likely to be unfamiliar with interrogational practice and may be 
more impaired or distracted by being involved in the conversation. In a study using police 
officers as participants, Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij (2005) found no difference in lie 
detection accuracy between interrogators and observers, indicating that this distinction may not 
be relevant to the interrogational context.  
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 External validity is also a consideration because multiple modes of cues may considered 
in evaluating veracity in actual assessment. Verbal cues have been found to be empirically-
supported indicators of deception (Vrij, 2008a) and it is likely that practitioners rely on 
paralingustic cues in conjunction with verbal and nonverbal cues when judging veracity. Lastly, 
it is important to note that the type of deception investigated by deception detection researchers 
may not be generalizable to the typical case of false confessions, where the false confessor may 
not be motivated to get the interviewer to believe them wholeheartedly, but rather to satisfy an 
interviewer who is already convinced of their guilt.  
Conclusion 
Identification of true and false confessions is a new area of deception detection and few 
studies have examined which cues are associated with veracity. Nevertheless, deception 
detection approaches hold promise for providing empirically-supported methods of identifying 
false confessions in order to prevent false convictions and to avoid high costs to unjustly 
convicted individuals and their communities. This study suggests while certain findings from the 
deception detection field, such as increased confidence due to training, may hold true for 
confessions, paralingustic cues may be less applicable to confessions than to other types of 
statements. The method of distributing experimental surveys online to participants is suggested 
as an alternative, cost-effective method for conducting experiments on deception detection. 
Although deception detection research has only recently begun examining true and false 
confessions, there is hope for the development of empirically-based assessment of confession 
evidence which, in combination with knowledge on individual and situational risk factors for 
false confessions, can help prevent false convictions. 
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